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Juridification Patterns for Social Regulation and the WTO:  
A Theoretical Framework 
ABSTRACT 
Free Trade has always been highly contested, but both the arguments about it and the 
treaties that regulate it have changed dramatically since the Second World War. Under 
the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) regime, objections to free 
trade were essentially economic, and tariffs were a nation state’s primary means of pro-
tecting its interests. However, by the early 1970s, tariffs had been substantially reduced, 
and the imposition and removal of non-tariff barriers that reflected a wide range of do-
mestic concerns about the protection of health, safety, and the environment have since 
come to dominate trade agreements and their implementation. The expanding scope of 
these international treaties, and their effect on domestic regulatory objectives, has cre-
ated new challenges for the nationstate, and for the international trade system as a 
whole. Domestic regulatory objectives that are generally embedded in a nation state’s 
legal system or even in its constitution, are now negotiable and are susceptible to adju-
dication at the international level where they may, or may not, be used to camouflage 
unrelated economic interests. The international trade system adapted to this situation in 
1994 by transforming the GATT into the World Trade Organization (WTO), which has 
more effective means for dispute resolution and includes a number of special agree-
ments – such as the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Meas-
ures (SPS) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) – with rules for 
balancing the economic concerns of free trade with the social concerns of regulatory 
objectives. These developments have generated legal queries about the general legiti-
macy of transnational governance arrangements and their ‘constitutionalization’, i.e. the 
quest for transnational governance that is mediated by law and not only accepted de 
facto but considered deserving of acceptance. 
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Juridification Patterns for Social Regulation and the WTO:  
A Theoretical Framework * 
INTRODUCTION 
When the European Commission launched its legendary programme, ‘Completion of 
the Internal Market’ in the mid eighties,1 both proponents and critics expected broad de-
regulation and a ‘race to the bottom’ wherein EC Member States sought to defend or 
strengthen economic competitiveness by loosening the regulatory grip. Regulation was 
considered a cost, and de-regulation a gain in efficiency. These expectations were thor-
oughly disappointed. Instead, we witnessed new trends in regulation and juridification2 
                                                 
*  A first draft of this paper was presented in November 2003 at the conference on ‘Debating the democratic legiti-
macy of the European Union’ at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research. The Colloquium on ‘Glob-
alization and its Discontents’ at the NYU Law School offered me the opportunity to present a new draft with an 
extended scope in February 2004. Damian Chalmers (London) was my commentator in Mannheim; Richard 
Stewart (NYU Law School). Rainer Nickel (Frankfurt a.M./Florence) commented on the second draft. They all 
have substantially contributed to my decision to change the format again. In this re-conceptualization, I am in-
debted to the participants in the research project on ‘Social Regulation and Free Trade’ at the Collaborative Re-
search Center 597 ‘Transformations of the State’ in Bremen (Ulrike Ehling, Josef Falke, Christiane Gerstetter, 
Christine Godt and Leonhard Maier). Special thanks to Christiane Gerstetter and David Gerl, who helped very in-
tensively with the literature and detailed comments. Special thanks also to Stephan Leibfried who has energeti-
cally and intensively accompanied the production of this essay. If the text has now become more accessible to po-
litical scientists, this is, to very large degree, a result of his supervision. — The paper will not be published in its 
present form. Instead, it will be revised again taking into account the discussions at the Workshop on Legal Pat-
terns of Transnational Social Regulation and International Trade organized by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and my-
self on September 24-25, 2004 at the EUI/RSCAS – Transatlantic Programme – in Florence. Two anonymous re-
viewers of the Sfb 597 have delivered very thoughtful, critical, constructive and demanding comments and sug-
gestions. Their quest for a rethinking of my rather rigid distinctions between national, European and international 
governance, for a richer empirical foundation of my argument, references to constitutional law doctrines and 
fields of environmental law I am not familiar all “deserve recognition” – but are too demanding to be taken into 
account more than selectively in the revision I could undertake at this stage. However the work on the publication 
of the proceedings of the Florence workshop is under way (Transnational Trade Governance and Social Regula-
tion: Tensions and Interdependencies, ed. by Christian Joerges and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann) and will lead to a 
more comprehensive response. 
1  European Commission 1985. 
2  This term will be used quite frequently in this essay along with the notion of ‘legalization’. Both concepts have 
different connotations. The term ‘juridification’ was introduced into the parlance of law and society studies as a 
translation of the notion of ‘Verrechtlichung’ first used in the Weimar Republic by labour lawyers from the left in 
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— intense re-regulation, new forms of co-operation among governmental and non-
governmental actors, and the promotion of a range of participation entitlements such as 
opening policy-making processes to civil society. Within Europe, free trade and market-
building objectives were accomplished in conjunction with the establishment of com-
plex regulatory machinery, especially in ‘social regulation’, such as the protection of 
health, safety and environmental interests.3 To use the terminology of the Bremen Chap-
ter One of this volume, the post-national constellation which Europeanization has gen-
erated leads to an erosion of the regulatory powers of the democratic, constitutional, 
interventionist state (the ‘DCIS’), and of its capability to weigh the costs and benefits of 
opening the national economy autonomously. But Europeanization has also led to the 
establishment of sophisticated transnational governance arrangements which nation 
states could not have accomplished on their own.  
Are there lessons to be learnt from the European experience for the organisation of 
free trade at international level? To what degree do we have to attribute the ‘regulatory 
re-embedding’ of free trade in Europe to specific supra-national institutional features 
and interest configurations? To what degree should these developments simply be un-
derstood as responses to internationally salient concerns? To what degree has workable 
social regulation become a precondition for the functioning of international markets? If 
free international trade can only be realised in conjunction with the establishment of 
transnational governance arrangements, how can the ‘reasonableness’ of transnational 
governance be assessed and ensured? Does the nation state have to accept the loss of 
regulatory autonomy because this is what the functioning of international markets re-
quires? Do the emerging transnational governance arrangements, to take up Jürgen 
Habermas’ formula, ‘deserve recognition’?4 
This essay is going to explore this bundle of questions in three steps:  
In Section I, we will summarize the European experience with an emphasis on Europe’s 
                                                                                                                                               
their critique of the use of law to domesticate class conflicts (cf., Teubner 1987: 9). It hence carries with it a per-
ception of the ambivalent effects of the use of law, which were characterized first as depoliticization and later, 
e.g., (and most famously) as a destruction of social relations, a ‘colonialisation of the life-world’ by Habermas 
(1985); cf. the recent thorough reconstruction by Humrich 2004: 4 ff. ‘Legalization’ analysis, as presented by 
Abbott et al. (2000), is not linked to these traditions and their critical normative agenda. Pertinent studies explore 
parallels and difference between the subjection of political process to rule of law requirements within states and 
the causes and consequences of rule-bound governance beyond the nations states (cf., Zangl/Zürn 2004; Zürn 
2005; see, also, Section III 2 infra. But there is no consensus among political scientists and legal sociologists and 
theorists on the proper use of both terms. 
3  We are following the definitions of Majone (1989) and Selznick (1985).  
4  Habermas 2001: 113. 
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institutional ingenuity as it embedded its market-building efforts in the construction of 
sophisticated regulatory machinery as a key part of the European multi-level system of 
governance. 
The regulatory choices open to the international trade system are, of course, more 
narrow, as we show in Section II. Its institutional centre, the World Trade Organisation, 
simply does not have the kind of regulatory powers on which Europe can rely. How-
ever, the strengthening of international commitments to free trade objectives — 
achieved in 1994 through the replacement of the former GATT by the new WTO regime 
— was not as one-dimensional as it is often portrayed in political arenas. The new WTO 
regime is a compound of governance arrangements which deal with non-tariff barriers 
to trade, i.e., with exactly the type of regulatory concerns to which Europe has re-
sponded in its regulatory policies since the mid 80s. In Section II, we will underline that 
the shift from the old GATT to the new WTO regime needs to be understood as a two-
fold process in which the regulatory autonomy of nation states is eroded while their 
regulatory concerns are built into the new transnational governance arrangements. 
‘Governance’ has become a buzz-word which has substituted the term regulation in 
many contexts. The new term has come into use at all ‘levels of governance’, first, in 
international relations, then, in the EU, and also within nation states. In section III, we 
will summarize the recent career of this concept, and point to its older equivalents in 
primarily normative and legal perspectives. The turn to novel forms of governance, it is 
submitted, is both a response to the impasses of traditional regulatory techniques, and a 
challenge to the notions of legitimacy which we have learned to appreciate within our 
national constitutional democracies. 
We are focusing on a particular segment of transnational governance, namely, the in-
terfaces and tensions between the promotion of free trade and the defence of regulatory 
concerns. We are interested in the potential of ‘legalization’5 strategies to resolve these 
tensions. The scope of our inquiries in this essay,6 will, however, be quite narrow. While 
the term ‘social regulation’ as we have just introduced it, comprises the regulation of 
safety at work and environmental protection, we will restrict our discussion to patterns 
of product regulation. This relatively narrow scope will allow us to look at the back-
ground context of these commitments with some intensity. In particular, we will pay 
attention to the ‘governance arrangements’ which substantiate and complement those 
commitments and seek to determine whether these arrangements should be understood 
as the functional equivalents of the administrative infrastructure of nation states. They 
                                                 
5  See note 6 supra. 
6  Not the project mentioned in note*! The full text of the application to the German Science Foundation is available 
(in German) at <http://www.staatlichkeit.uni-bremen.de/ with a summary in English.  
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seem to us to represent a new type of ‘juridification’ in the international system, which 
neither traditional international law, nor the other disciplines of international adminis-
trative and economic law could, heretofore, conceptualise.7 But even in this respect, our 
project is far from being comprehensive in its scope and ambitions.8 To rephrase these 
observations: we are interested in the erosion of the regulatory autonomy of nation-
states and of their ability to ensure compliance with their constitutional commitments. 
We are equally interested in the building up of transnational regulatory capacities. We 
therefore explore the transnational governance arrangements and seek to understand the 
peculiar legitimacy of their problématique. This changing domestic/international inter-
face could well amount to one of the major transformations of the state after its ‘Golden 
Age’. 
I. NON-TARIFF BARRIERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: FREE 
TRADE AS INSTIGATOR OF REGULATORY INNOVATION 
The re-regulatory and modernizing side-effects of the ‘completion’ of the European 
Internal Market remain puzzling, but are so well documented9 that we can refrain from 
reporting them in any detail. What we will focus on, instead, are the governance pat-
terns which Europe has developed in its search for integration strategies that ensure the 
compatibility of the logic of market-building with the market-correcting logic of social 
regulation. If we understand these patterns as responses to the political weight that regu-
latory concerns for the protection of health, safety and the environment have gained, we 
will have to deal with their functionally equivalent developments at international level. 
This review should help us to examine to what degree the European responses are de-
pendent upon the specific institutional features of the European Union and whether, as a 
consequence, they can not be transplanted to the international level. 
I.1 The Cassis jurisprudence under Article 28 EC Treaty: a conflict-
of-laws approach  
The most important of Europe’s institutional innovations is hardly mentioned any 
longer in the debates on the so-called ‘new modes of governance’. Back in 1979, the 
                                                 
7  See section III 2 infra. 
8  In their systematic account of the structures of global administrative governance, Kingsbury, Kirsch and Stewart 
(2004: Section II A, p.8) distinguish between five types: ‘administration by formal international administration; 
administration based on collective action by transnational networks of governmental officials; distributed admini-
stration conducted by national regulators under treaty regimes; mutual recognition arrangements or cooperative 
standards; administration by hybrid intergovernmental-private arrangements; and administration by private insti-
tutions with regulatory functions’. Our emphasis is on the two types mentioned last. 
9  Cf., for example, Eichener 2000; with respect to safety at work, cf., Bücker 1997.  
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Cassis de Dijon case10 saw the European Court of Justice (ECJ) declare that a German 
ban on the marketing of a French liqueur — the alcohol content of which was lower 
than its German counterpart — was incompatible with the principle of free movement 
of goods (Article 30 EC Treaty, now 28 EC). The ECJ’s response to the conflicts be-
tween French and German policies was as convincing as it was trifling: confusion of 
German consumers could be avoided and a reasonable degree of protection against er-
roneous decisions by German consumers could be achieved by disclosing the low alco-
hol content of the French liqueur. With this observation, the Court defined in a new way 
the constitutional competence to review the legitimacy of national legislation which 
presented a non-tariff barrier to free intra-Community trade. This move was of princi-
pled theoretical importance and had far-reaching practical impact (e.g., Maduro 1997: 
150 ff.; Weiler 1999: 221 ff.). 
In a comparison of European and international responses to non-tariff barriers to 
trade, it is important to underline that the ECJ’s celebrated argument can easily be trans-
lated into the language of a much older discipline, namely, that of conflict of laws. What 
the ECJ did in substance was to identify a ‘meta-norm’ which both France and Ger-
many, as parties to the conflict, could accept. Since both countries were committed to 
the free trade objective, they were also prepared to accept that restrictions of free trade 
must be based on credible regulatory concerns. Further examples of this type of conflict 
resolution at the WTO level will be mentioned in Section II 1. Its principal and meta-
juridical importance becomes immediately apparent once we take the fact that market-
creating and market-correcting regulatory policies are nothing exceptional into account. 
Without going into the theoretical underpinnings of this argument in any depth, we sim-
ply submit here that trade with ever more sophisticated products ‘requires’ the devel-
opment of regulatory machinery to ensure the ‘trustworthiness’ of such products to both 
traders and consumers (Block 2005; Vos 2004).11  
This argument has empirical, functionalist and normative dimensions. A blatant dis-
regard of regulatory concerns, and the insistence on the abolition of non-tariff obstacles 
                                                 
10  ECJ 1979: 649. 
11  Block (2005) developed this argument systematically in the context of his reconstruction of Karl Polanyi’s politi-
cal economy: ‘Once it is recognized and acknowledged that markets are and must be socially constructed, then 
the critical question is no longer the quantitative issue of how much state or how much market, but rather the 
qualitative issue of how and for what ends should markets and states be combined and what are the structures and 
practices in civil society that will sustain a productive synergy of states and markets’. In contrast, Vos (2004: 9-
13) conceptualises the irritations or anxieties of consumers as a challenge to be addressed in ‘an overarching ap-
proach to risk regulation’, within which it will be important to enhance the credibility of European institutions ‘by 
means of principles of good governance’ (14-21). 
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to free trade, in conflict-of-laws terms: the refusal to recognize and apply foreign public 
law is no longer an option open to the proponents of free trade. This is why we are wit-
nessing the institutionalization of the independent bodies entrusted with the task of 
identifying the rules and principles under which the free trade objective and the respect 
for legitimate regulatory concerns become compatible. The European experience is, 
indeed, instructive. In particular, the case law on Article 30 EC Treaty (now 28 EC) has 
repeatedly indicated how the idiosyncrasies of individual states can be identified as such 
and reduced to a civilised level (Joerges 1997; Maduro 1997: 150 ff.) – autonomy-
protecting and community-compatible, as Fritz Scharpf (1994) has put it.. 
I.2 The new approach to technical harmonisation and standards: to-
wards ‘private transnationalism’ 
In the presentation of its White Paper on Completion of the Internal Market, the Euro-
pean Commission (1995) prudently underlined the basis of its new integration strategy 
in the jurisprudence of the ECJ in general, and its Cassis-judgment in particular. The 
White Paper’s proposals were, however, much more radical than the Court’s jurispru-
dence. What the Commission suggested was a twofold move: from mediation between 
conflicting regulatory policies, to the establishment of transnational governance patterns 
and from public to private transnationalism. The so-called new approach to technical 
harmonisation and standards was the most significant contribution to this new orienta-
tion. 
The story of the new approach has often been told.12 In its efforts to build a common 
market, the EC found itself in a profound dilemma: market integration depended upon 
the ‘positive’ harmonisation of countless regulatory provisions. Harmonisation was dif-
ficult to achieve even after the old unanimity rule of Article 100 EC Treaty was re-
placed by qualified-majority voting in Article 100a EC Treaty as introduced by the Sin-
gle European Act of 1987. Similarly, the implementation of new duties to recognize 
‘foreign’ legislation which the Cassis de Dijon decision of 1979 had arguably imposed, 
posed complex problems. Somewhat paradoxically, self-regulation, a technique very 
widely used in Germany in particular, was by no means easier to live with. Voluntary 
product standards were ‘private’ obstacles to trade, which the Community legislature 
could not overcome by legislative fiat. How can we/the EU get out of this impasse? 
The new approach achieved precisely this through a bundle of interrelated measures: 
European legislation was confined to laying down ‘essential safety requirements’, 
whereas the task of detailing the general requirements was delegated to the experts of 
European and national standardisation organisations. The involvement of non-
governmental actors involved a de facto ‘delegation’ of law-making powers, which 
                                                 
12  Falke/Joerges 1991; recently and brilliantly, Schepel 2005: 225 ff..  
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could not be openly admitted. Harm Schepel13 cites a leading representative of the stan-
dardisation community: the new method ‘makes it possible to distinguish better between 
those aspects of Community harmonisation activities which fall within the province of 
the law, and those which fall within the province of technology, and to differentiate be-
tween matters which fall within the competence of public authorities and those which 
are the responsibility of manufacturers and importers’ (Nicolas 1995: 94).  
The language covers and hides the political dimensions of standardisation. This is 
small wonder, because the advocates of the new approach had to present their project in 
legally acceptable clothes. They were perfectly aware of the limited guidance that ‘es-
sential safety requirements’ can offer in the standardisation process. But they had good 
reasons to trust in the responsibility of the standardisation process — and the potential 
of national and European public authorities to intervene, should that trust be disap-
pointed/betrayed/misplaced (Falke 2001; Schepel 2005: 403 ff.).  
I.3 Administering the Internal Market: the comitology system and Eu-
ropean agencies  
Two more European institutional innovations need to be mentioned: the comitology 
system and European agencies. Both operate at the crossroads of market building and 
social regulation. Comitology committees, which are composed of administrative practi-
tioners and experts from the Member States, are supposed to support the Commission in 
the implementation of European legislative programmes; they are also involved in the 
continuous process of amending existing legislation, filling legislative gaps and prepar-
ing new initiatives. These committees embody the functional and structural tensions 
which characterise internal market regulation. They hover between ‘technical’ and ‘po-
litical’ considerations, between the functional needs and the ethical/social criteria which 
inform European regulation. Their often very fluid composition not only reflects upon 
the regulatory endeavour to balance the rationalisation of technical criteria against 
broader political concerns, but also forcefully highlights the schisms that exist among 
the political interests of those engaged in the process of internal market regulation. Even 
where they are explicitly established to support and oversee the implementing powers 
delegated to the Commission, committees are deeply involved in political processes and 
often resemble ‘mini-councils’, in that they are the forum in which the balancing of a 
European market-integrationist logic against a Member State interest — in terms of the 
substance and the costs of consumer protection and cohesive national economic devel-
opment — has to be achieved (in detail, Joerges/Vos 1999). Their activities can be char-
acterised as ‘political administration’ (Joerges 1999), an oxymoron, which reflects their 
hybrid nature.  
                                                 
13  2005: 65. 
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Independent agencies were the core institutions advocated by Giandomenico Majone 
(e.g. 1989, 1994) in his design of a European ‘regulatory state’. Majone’s suggestions 
attracted a great deal of attention but were never implemented. Europe has, however, 
adopted his term and established an impressive number of bodies which are called 
agencies (Chiti 2003). What these bodies are, or will become, is indeterminate. This 
much is uncontested: agencies are certainly not self-sufficient bureaucratic entities. 
Charged with the regulation of market entry and exit, or with more general informal, 
and policy-informing, information-gathering duties, these new European entities meet a 
technical demand for market-corrective and sector-specific regulation. In their public 
presentation, it is often submitted that their functions are primarily technocratic. This is 
what they may accomplish best, and such a function seems well compatible with their 
semi-autonomous status, and the expectation that they should also give voice to private 
market interests. It is equally compatible with the thesis that ‘administering’ the Internal 
Market has more to do with the ‘neutral’ sustenance of individual economic enterprises 
than with the imposition of (collective) political/social values. The placement of the 
new entities under the Commission’s institutional umbrella, and the presence of national 
representatives within their management structures notwithstanding, agencies seem, in 
the main, to be shielded from explicitly political processes by their founding statutes 
(Council directives and regulations), permanent staff, organisational independence, 
varying degrees of budgetary autonomy, and direct networking with national adminis-
trators. Their autonomy and independence is also limited for a second reason: they must 
co-operate with a web of national authorities in accomplishing the tasks laid down in 
European legislation. Because of these relationships, it is virtually impossible to allocate 
responsibility for policy decisions to one set of civil servants or another.  
Among the ‘modes of governance’ not addressed in the preceding overview are 
processes of regulatory competition and the open method of co-ordination (OMC), 
which has gained prominence in the realm of social policy. These two mechanisms are 
not directly concerned with the definition of rules and standards in the fields of social 
regulation. But the differences between them and the patterns of juridification we have 
looked at are gradual, rather than a matter of principle. The conflict-of-laws approach, 
to which the Cassis jurisprudence remains committed, respects the autonomy of EC 
Member States, and hence their room for experimental manoeuvres to a significant de-
gree. The transnational governance arrangements through which the new approach, 
comitology, and even the new European agencies operate, cannot be equated with some 
Weberian type of administrative machinery. They all leave room, and build upon, the 
institutionalisation of political (deliberative) processes.  
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II. NON-TARIFF BARRIERS AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION: A 
SURVEY OF CONFLICT-RESOLVING AND POLICY-INTEGRATING 
MECHANISMS 
European law and WTO law represent different legal worlds. So obvious and significant 
are the institutional discrepancies that comparisons between them, which seek to draw 
upon the experiences of both institutions, are often considered as being all too risky. 
And yet, some obvious functional equivalents seem to merit closer scrutiny.14 Both insti-
tutions have to balance free trade objectives and regulatory concerns, or, as the Appel-
late Body in the Hormones case put it: ‘the shared, but sometimes competing, interests 
of promoting international trade and of protecting … life and health’.15 The non-tariff 
barriers to trade to which the proponents of international free trade had to pay ever more 
attention in the last decades are requirements which the EU tends to recognize as legiti-
mate restrictions to the freedom of intra-Community trade. The SPS and the TBT 
Agreements are institutionalised responses to health and safety concerns, and the le-
gitimacy of trade restrictions resulting from environmental policies is explicitly recog-
nized in the preamble of the WTO Agreement.  
Our exploration of these parallels in this section will deal with conflict resolutions 
under these agreements. We will, on the one hand, contrast juridified and judicialized 
resolution as opposed to political conflict resolution. We will focus here16 on ‘product’ 
as opposed to ‘process’ regulation, and the governance patterns in this area. Both of 
these distinctions refer to separate debates, but are nevertheless interdependent. Product 
regulation is obviously more closely linked to the realisation of free trade than process 
regulation, because product related mandatory requirements can hinder the importation 
of goods directly, whereas process regulation need not affect the quality of the output of 
production. Stricter and more costly standards can be a competitive disadvantage. Con-
flicts arising from such differences are often primarily economic. But the distinction is 
of limited use: environmental and safety at work requirements may relate to the product 
itself; low environmental standards may have external effects on other countries; safety-
at-work standards may have a human rights basis; and, last but not least, international 
agreements often do not apply the product/process distinction. Suffice it here to point to 
                                                 
14  Cf., Scott 2002, 2004; de Búrca 2002; Peel 2004 (Peel’s comparative observations on the differences between the 
US, the EU and the WTO are all interesting and helpful, and also quite sensitive to the differences between these 
polities and regimes, although they could have paid more attention to the specifics of transnational policy forma-
tion).  
15  Report of the Appellate Body on EC - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, Report of the Appellate 
Body, WT/DS26/AB/R & WT/DS48/AB/R, 16 January 1998, para. 177.  
16  But, see note 11 supra. 
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the mentioning of ‘measures necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life 
or health’ in the Preamble and in Article 2.1 of the SPS Agreement. It seems neverthe-
less plausible to assume that the juridification of transnational product regulation will be 
more intense than transnational standardisation in the field of safety at work and envi-
ronmental protection. To put it slightly differently, the latter can probably be better ex-
plained by political processes, whereas the former will more often be dictated by func-
tional necessities. 
II.1 Alternatives to substantive transnationalism: proceduralized policy 
co-ordination through conflict-of-laws methodologies  
As underlined in the previous section, the celebrated jurisprudence of the ECJ on Arti-
cle 28 EC, which seeks to ‘harmonize’ the principle of freedom of intra-Community 
trade with the respect for the legitimate regulatory concerns of EC Member States can 
be understood as a modernization of conflicts law because this jurisprudence seeks to 
identify meta-norms which the jurisdictions involved can accept as a supra-nationally 
valid yardstick for evaluating and correcting their legislation. The same holds true for 
the reports of the WTO Appellate Body which assesses the compatibility of health and 
safety related non-tariff barriers to trade with the SPS Agreement. To generalize this 
observation, the SPS Agreement does not invoke some supranational legislative author-
ity. It provides a framework within which WTO Members are to seek a resolution of 
conflicts arising from the extra-territorial impact of their regulatory policies. To become 
aware of these parallels is not just doctrinally interesting, but also practically relevant 
because a conflict-of-laws approach is politically much ‘softer’ than the imposition of a 
supranational substantive rule — Robert Howse and Kalypso Nicolaїdis17 could hardly 
call ‘constitutionalization’ through a conflict-of-laws approach ‘a step too far’.18 
The modern legal history of conflict of laws and its methodology is part of the politi-
cal history of the sovereign nation state, and the conceptualisation of international rela-
tions by the various legal disciplines is based on the same paradigm as traditional theo-
ries of international relations. In a very brief account, traditional (public) international 
                                                 
17  Howse/Nicolaїdis 2001.  
18  But they might object to the use of the term ‘constitutionalisation’ which is simply not in use in the debates on the 
characterization of WTO law (see for a subtle overview N. Walker 2001). If one accepts our premise that the na-
tion state has become unable to comply with the normative yardsticks of constitutional democracies (see Section 
III 2 and note 52 infra) then an outright rejection of the use of the term seems ‘a step too far’. It is true, however, 
that the term then loses its links with the notion of polity building on which constitutionalists tend to insist (see, 
for example, N. Walker 2001: 34). ‘Constitutionalisation’ then denotes not more (and not less!) than the Law’s 
efforts to ensure the legitimacy (in a qualitative sense) of political and legal decision making (see also Section III 
3 infra). 
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law (ius gentium) was confined to an ordering of interstate relations. National public 
law, in particular, administrative law, was conceptualised as an emanation of the sover-
eign. A truly ‘international’ public law was hence unconceivable. ‘International’ public 
law was instead delineating the sphere of application of national provisions — ‘one-
sidedly’- because in the heydays of legal positivism any subjection to the commands of 
the law of another sovereign seemed inconceivable.19  
By contrast, private international law in the von Savigny tradition was more univer-
salistic in its orientations. Its universalism was based upon an understanding of private 
law as the organiser of strictly private relations in a, by definition, apolitical (civil) soci-
ety, i.e., Gesellschaft. The private law orders of civilized nations could be treated as 
equivalent and the application of foreign law was not perceived as a threat to the sover-
eignty of the forum state. This type of universalism is fully compatible with the refusal 
to support foreign regulatory objectives. Such ‘political’ dimensions are beyond private 
law. Von Savigny knew, of course, about public law and the public order. But to incor-
porate what we are used to call regulatory or political objectives into the legal order was 
about realising non-legal (außerrechtliche) values, and thus was stepping outside the 
law. If private international law were to engage in such activities it would, in his under-
standing, cease to be law at all.20 These traditional dichotomies of private law and public 
(including administrative) law are definitely outdated. The disciplines of international 
private, economic and administrative law are all aware of the regulatory dimensions of 
modern legal systems and take them into account in the choice-of-law process. The dif-
ficulty lies in getting beyond ‘unilateral’ or ‘one-sided’ definitions of the international 
sphere of application of domestic law (the lex fori) and to conceptualise co-operative 
legal responses for all concerned jurisdictions. This hesitancy is often expressed as a 
refusal to obey to the commands of a foreign sovereign, but it can also be based on good 
‘constitutional’ reasons, namely, on objections to the legitimacy of validity claims of 
law that is not generated in democratic processes. Furthermore, where courts are ex-
pected to handle transnational matters and/or to mediate between autonomous state or-
ders, they seem to move beyond their constitutionally legitimated functions. Thus, a 
                                                 
19  See Vogel 1965: 176-239; for alternative traditions, cf., Tietje 2001. See also Joerges 1979: 8 ff.; for a surpris-
ingly similar recent reconstruction cf. Humrich 2004: 17 ff. Humrich restricts his — otherwise enormously rich 
— analysis to ‘international law in the narrow sense of interstae law’ (at p. 3). In that respect international law 
and international relations scholars tend to share the same benign neglect of international economic law 
(Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht) which accompanied the transformation of the liberal to the interventionist state. See 
also Section III 1 infra. 
20 Israёl 2004: Ch. 4, para.1.2, p. 107. 
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‘judicialization’ of international conflicts is a challenge to legal theory 21 — an aspect 
which political scientists should take seriously.22 
Once one has become aware of these difficulties, the virtues of the conflict-of-laws 
alternative to true substantive supranationalism become apparent. The search for a con-
flict norm can be understood as a ‘proceduralization’23 of the conflict between compet-
ing validity claims, as a search for a meta-norm to which parties can commit themselves 
in a search for a solution to their conflict without betraying their loyalty to their own 
law. To take up the trivial Cassis case again, France does not need to adapt the alcohol 
content of its liqueur to German legal requirements, while Germany can continue to 
protect the expectations of its consumers. Both jurisdictions can live with a consumer 
information requirement. However, solutions of this kind are not always as unproblem-
atic and soft as the Cassis case. The transatlantic conflict over hormones in beef pro-
vides an instructive example.24 The US and (most of the Member States of) the EU are 
in disagreement regarding the addition of growth promoting hormones to beef-
producing cattle. Can both parties agree to expose their practices to a science-based 
analysis of the health risks which the consumption of hormone enhanced beef may en-
tail? The requirement in the SPS Agreement that the measures of the WTO Member 
must not be ‘maintained without sufficient scientific evidence’ (Article 2.2) and that it 
must be ‘based on’ a risk assessment (Article 5) seems to suggest exactly that. But, as 
the involved actors know all too well, a meta-norm referring to science as an arbitrator 
is not so innocent. Three reasons are sufficient here25 to illustrate this point: firstly, sci-
                                                 
21  Nobody has ever pointed this out more provocatively and stringently than Brainerd Currie in his search for a new 
choice-of-law methodology. Currie’s views were—since the time of their presentation in the late 50s and early 
60s until today — perceived as a break with the traditions of American conflicts law, let alone continental private 
international law, that was nothing less than revolutionary. Laws, statutes and even common law rules, Currie ar-
gued, should be read as pursuing some policy. His real assault on the citadels of private international law, how-
ever, were the implications of this realist insights for intrastate settings: The application and implementation of 
policy-guided laws, he submitted, will often be backed by the ‘interests’ of that state (Currie’s unfortunate term: 
‘governmental interests’), which courts must not disregard (Currie 1963c). It is not compatible with the judicial 
function in constitutional democracies, Currie concluded, that courts balance competing state interests (Currie 
1963c). To rephrase these objections in more contemporary terms, the courts of national states are neither legiti-
mated nor well equipped to address the challenges of transnational governance. Such theses may sound provoca-
tive, but are to be taken seriously (see Section III.3 infra).  
22  See Stone Sweet 1997, but also note 29 infra. 
23  On this term, cf., Section III 1 infra. 
24  Cf., note 20 supra and out of an enormous number of comments Godt 1998; Joerges 2001; Perez 2004: 115 ff. 
25  The point will be taken up in Section III 3 infra. 
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ence does not typically answer the questions that policy-makers and lawyers unambigu-
ously pose; secondly, and even more importantly, it cannot resolve ethical and norma-
tive controversies; thirdly, consumer anxieties about ‘scientifically speaking’ marginal 
risks may be so considerable that policy-makers cannot neglect them.26  
It is submitted that, all of these difficulties notwithstanding, a conflict-of-laws ap-
proach to regulatory differences offers an often viable alternative to a search for sub-
stantive transnational rules. This alternative is less intrusive and therefore easier to ac-
cept. Even where the meta-norms remain indeterminate, they may nevertheless help to 
structure the controversies among the parties to a conflict by re-opening political, poten-
tially deliberative, processes. Conflicts-of-laws is, in cases of true conflicts, in the last 
instance, a political exercise, as Brainerd Currie once argued.27 This does not, however, 
exclude the proposition that conflict rules may be strong enough to guide the solution of 
conflicts. And even where they are not, the ‘shadow of the law’ may be sufficient to 
promote international comitas or diplomacy.28 The borderlines are not as strict as legal 
formalists tend to portray them.  
In conclusion, the history of the American-European conflict over the use of growth 
promoting hormones documents that ‘judicialization’ — i.e., ‘the presence of binding 
third party enforcement’29 — which the WTO has achieved through the Understanding 
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) does not guaran-
tee definite solutions, but may instead initiate a re-politicisation of the whole process. Is 
this a failure, an advantage, or simply unavoidable? We will return to this question fur-
ther on.30 Suffice it to note here that the parallels with the EU system’s potential to 
change from legalization to political processes are striking, and that the boundaries be-
tween conflict mediation through proceduralizing conflict-of-laws methodologies and 
the establishment of transnational governance arrangements are of gradual, rather than 
principal, significance.  
II.2 Limits of juridification: the example of health-related transnational 
governance arrangements  
There are, so we have concluded in the introductory remarks, many (functional) reasons 
which militate in favour of internationally valid product standards. Unsurprisingly, in-
ternational standardisation is indeed taking place on a great scale in the ISO, the (non-
                                                 
26  Cf., Joerges 1997; Joerges/Neyer 2003. 
27  Currie 1963b; 1963c. 
28  Cf., Joerges/Neyer 2003; Weiler 2001. 
29  Thus, the definition of the term by De Bièvre 2004: 3. It is a workable but under-complex formula as De Bièvre 
himself shows in later parts of his paper (e.g. at 7).  
30  In Section III. 
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governmental) International Organisation for Standardization, the IEC (International 
Electrotechnical Commission) and the ITU (International Telecommunication Union). 
The ISO is administering around 14,000 standards.31 Some 30,000 experts, organised in 
Technical Committees, Sub-committees and Working Groups, are engaged in their ela-
boration.32 The CAC, the (intergovernmental) Codex Alimentarius Commission,33 a mu-
tual institution of the World Health Organization (WHO) and of the Food and Agricul-
ture Organization (FAO), is the relevant body in the foodstuffs sector.34 (on its operati-
on, see Herwig 2004; Poli 2004; & Victor 2000). 
Both bodies follow a harmonization philosophy, which has its basis in the pertinent 
WTO related agreements, in the case of the ISO, in the TBT Agreement, and, in the case 
of the CAC, in the SPS Agreement. But on a near to global scale, any stringent harmo-
nization is neither economically reasonable nor politically conceivable. Moreover, 
contrary to the situation in the EU, the WTO-ISO or WTO-CAC compound have no 
supranational legal competence which could trump the validity of national legislation. 
Anybody sufficiently familiar with the jurisprudence of the ECJ on Article 28 EC Trea-
ty and on the New Approach knows that such legal deficiencies are important — but 
also knows that they are not insurmountable barriers to transnational governance.  
The TBT Agreement prescribes in its Article 2.2 that the technical regulations of its 
Members ‘shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objec-
tive, taking into account the risks that non-fulfilment of these objectives would create’. 
The legitimate objectives include the concerns recognised by European law, in particu-
lar, the protection of health, safety and the environment.35 Unsurprisingly, there is no 
equivalent to the European mutual recognition rule, but only a softer commitment to 
‘give positive consideration’ to foreign regulations where ‘these regulations adequately 
fulfil the objectives’ of the importing Member. The same objective is served by the pre-
ference which, in Article 2.8, is only softly prescribed for performance, rather than 
construction or design standards. All this caution notwithstanding, the TBT Agreement 
is a powerful means for the promotion of reliance on international product standards as 
it provides in its Article 2.2: 
Where technical regulations are required and international standards exist or their 
completion is imminent, members shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, as a ba-
                                                 
31  Detailed and regularly updated information is available at   
<http://www.iso.org/iso/en/aboutiso/introduction/index.html>. 
32  See Falke 2001; Schepel 2005: 177 ff. both with many references. 
33  <http://www.codexalimentarius.net. 
34  On its operation, cf., Herwig 2004; Victor 2000. 
35  On these parallels, see Scott 2002, 2004; and Peel 2004. 
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sis for their technical regulations except when such international standards or relevant 
parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate 
objectives pursued, for instance, because of fundamental climatic or geographical fac-
tors or fundamental technological problems.  
The SPS Agreement pursues a very similar strategy which proved to be quite effective.36 
Prior to the adoption of the SPS Agreement, the impact of the CAC standards was appa-
rently quite limited. They had no legal significance whatsoever. The SPS Agreement, 
which, in Article 3.1 requires that WTO Members ‘base’ SPS measures on international 
standards, guidelines and recommendations, has changed the situation quite dramatical-
ly. Legally speaking, the SPS requirement is clearly much less than a mandatory supra-
nationally valid rule. The ‘right’ of WTO Members to determine the risk level that their 
constituency has to live with is de jure not at issue. Instead, the SPS Agreement has to 
build upon an incentive strategy which is similar to the safety ‘presumption’ upon 
which the European New Approach to harmonisation and standards rests. Its Article 3.2 
provides that national ‘sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to internatio-
nal standards, guidelines or recommendations shall be deemed to be necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health, and presumed to be consistent with the relevant 
provisions of this Agreement and of GATT 1994.’ In this way, Article 3.2 SPS imports 
these norms into the WTO system.  
Our observations so far have not (yet) dealt with the legitimacy of transnational gov-
ernance but are only concerned with the strategies through which transnational product 
regulation is achieved. As has become apparent, neither the TBT nor the SPS Agree-
ment seek to prescribe a substantive uniform yardstick for the weighing of the costs and 
benefits of product standards; instead, they remain akin to a conflict-of-laws approach 
in that they identify meta-norms which help to mediate the conflicting economic inter-
ests and regulatory concerns. In the case of the SPS Agreement, ‘science’ is the most 
visible guidepost. ‘Science’ does not, however, figure as some objective super-standard 
which could prescribe the contents of regulatory decisions. The function of appeals to 
‘science’ is to discipline and rationalise regulatory debates. But even this cautious inter-
pretation of the potential function of commitments to ‘science’ needs to be further quali-
fied. The beef hormones saga, which is of exemplary importance here, did not end in 
any precise agreement about the kind of scientific evidence that the parties to the con-
flict must submit.37 The Report of the Appellate Body even explicitly recognized that:  
the risk that is to be evaluated in a risk assessment under Art. 5.1 is not only risk ascer-
tainable in a science laboratory operating under strictly controlled conditions, but also 
                                                 
36  See Streinz 1996; Victor 2000; and Herwig 2004. 
37  See, for example, Godt 1998; Joerges 2001; Joerges/Neyer 2003; Perez 2004: 132 ff. and Peel 2004. 
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risk in human societies as they actually exist, in other words, the actual potential for 
adverse effects on human health in the real world where people live and work and die.38   
The TBT Agreement and the ISO, as well as the SPS Agreement and the CAC, provide 
a framework for the elaboration of transnational product standards — a framework, 
which does, however, remain embedded in, and dependent upon, political processes.  
II.3 Two interim observations 
Our analysis warrants two concluding observations from which the issues to be discus-
sed in the next session follow with a compelling logic.  
The first concerns the emergence of transnational ‘law’. Juridification processes 
which respond to concerns of social regulation, so we have argued, are most likely in 
the field of product safety requirements. However, neither the WTO-TBT-ISO nor the 
WTO-SPS-CAC norm production can be equated with the processes of law-making and 
regulation in constitutional democracies. The co-ordination and norm-generating me-
chanisms that we observe may be more adequately, albeit somewhat vaguely, characte-
rised as ‘governance arrangements’ — and ‘governance’ is the category which we will 
explore first.39  
The second observation concerns the relationship between law and politics, i.e., the 
embeddedness of juridification in political processes at transnational level. The intensity 
of this dependence is a matter of degree. Where conflicts can be resolved through choi-
ce-of-law approaches, the law is relatively strong, albeit ‘imperfect’, in that it refrains 
from imposing substantive rules with supranational validity claims. Where transnational 
governance ‘needs’ substantive rules, be it in the field of product or process regulation, 
the intensity of political supervision is stronger. Our conclusion may sound vague and 
daring to political or social scientists but it also seems unavoidable to lawyers. A hypo-
thesis may suffice at this point: we assume that the tensions between law and politics 
need to be rephrased as the legitimacy problematique of transnational governance. This 
is the second issue to which the following section will turn.  
III. THE TURN TO GOVERNANCE AND ITS DISTINCT LEGITIMACY 
PROBLÉMATIQUE 
Governance has become an extremely popular concept in Europe ever since the Presi-
dent of the Commission used it in a programmatic speech delivered on 15 February 
2000 to the European Parliament in Strasbourg.40 At this occasion — with Europe in the 
                                                 
38  Appellate Body Report, EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R and 
WT/DS48/AB/R, para. 187. 
39  Sections III 1 and III 2 infra. 
40  <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=SPEECH/00/41|0|AGED&lg=EN. 
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grip of the BSE crisis and its impact on the reputation of the European regulatory state 
— Romano Prodi announced far-reaching and ambitious reforms. This was a message 
spoken in a new vocabulary, announcing a fresh agenda and a novel working method. 
Prodi envisaged a new division of labour between political actors and civil society, and 
a more democratic form of partnership between the layers of governance in Europe. It 
was this package of innovation, which was strategically launched into a legally unde-
fined space somewhere between a technocratic and administrative understanding and a 
fresh democratisation of the European Union, that attracted the attention of political 
scientists and lawyers.41  
One of the insights that this debate has produced is that the ‘turn to governance’ is by 
no means a purely European invention but has international and nation-state parallels. 
‘Governance’ is a response to interdependent phenomena: to failures of traditional regu-
latory law, to the erosion of nation state governance and to the emergence of post-
national constellations. The interdependence of these phenomena is the basis of our ar-
gument, which will be submitted in three steps. We start with a reflection on the na-
tional level. The ‘turn to governance’ was discovered, albeit in somewhat different 
terms, decades ago – and the responses developed since the 1980s remain attractive be-
cause the tribute they paid to functional necessities did not betray the law’s proprium, 
its inherent links with the legitimacy problematique of governance practices (III 1). At 
European level, the turn to governance came about for basically the same reasons as 
earlier changes had occurred within the nation-state since the European Community 
engaged in, or got entangled in, its ‘political administration’ of the Internal Market. 
However, even though the similarities between the turn to governance at European and 
national level are striking, the European legitimacy problématique is distinct in one im-
portant respect, it is different in that Europe has to conceptualise legitimate governance 
in a ‘market without a state’. However, this does not imply that Europe should, or could, 
forget about the constitutional idea of law-mediated legitimacy (III 2). The problé-
matique is again different at international level. Transnational governance at WTO level 
cannot duplicate the EU model. The barriers to equivalent legitimacy enhancing strate-
gies strengthen the political chances of technocratic legitimacy notions. These, however, 
are by no means the only conceivable way out of this dilemma. Transnational govern-
ance can build upon ‘societal constitutionalism’, upon conflict-of-laws methodologies – 
and, also, on comity (comitas)42 (III 3).  
                                                 
41  See Joerges et al. 2001, and, for a more recent systematic survey, Jachtenfuchs/Kohler-Koch 2004. 
42  Comity is, again, a term from the world of conflict of laws. Comitas is an ancient ‘doctrine’ with a complex 
history and an ambivalent heritage. Its dark side is a subordination of law under political prerogatives and the de-
nial of legal duties to respect foreign law and interests. Its brighter side, which we recall, is the respect of foreign 
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III.1 Governance practices in constitutional states: bringing the 80s 
back in 
The seemingly irresistible career of the governance concept is new, although the phe-
nomena it denotes are less so. In Germany, the inclusion of non-governmental actors 
into law-making processes and their participation in the political programmes govern-
ments design to resolve social problems is as old as that country’s ‘organized capita-
lism’. What is changing and new is the deliberate use and sophisticated design of con-
temporary ‘modes’ of governance in the context of privatization and deregulation stra-
tegies and risk society issues, and of Europeanisation and globalisation processes.43 
What may also be new is their international salience. To cite one particularly interesting 
American contributor, Jody Freeman defines ‘governance’ as a ‘set of negotiated relati-
onships between public and private actors’, which may concern ‘policy-making, imple-
mentation and enforcement’.44 She points to a broad variety of administrative contexts, 
including standard-setting, health care delivery, and prison management. Some of them 
are clearly public responsibilities. Does this mean that any involvement of non-
governmental actors is illegitimate? The reply to this query is her most interesting point: 
the inclusion of private actors into governance arrangements ‘might extend public va-
lues to private actors to reassure public law scholars that mechanisms exist for structu-
ring public-private partnerships in democracy-enhancing ways’.45 
Where this is the case, the performance of such partnerships often seems superior to 
the achievements of governmental actors and bureaucracies. In this sense, ‘governance’ 
could be called a productive activity. Is this a type of ‘output legitimacy’ with which 
constitutional democracies should not content themselves? Such a framing of the 
                                                                                                                                               
law and foreign interests. (cf., Paul 1991; Israёl 2004: Ch. 4. and most recently Späth, “Zum gegenwärtigen Stand 
der Doctrine of Comity im Recht der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika”, des Internationalen Privat- und Ver-
fahrensrechts (2005): 3 (forthcoming). Even that brighter side, however, is ambivalent, since the understanding of 
the term hovers between “courtoisie internationale”, political opportunism and “hard” international law. Späth, in 
his careful reconstruction of the American judicial praxis sees the doctrine evolving into “a true legal principle”. 
That somewhat bold conclusion is, however, somewhat discredited by his observation, that American law re-
serves to itself the right to decide about the existence of a commitment under international law. Our probablöy 
idiosyncratic use of the notion underlines the difficulty of identifying conflict-of-laws solutions of general valid-
ity: no law is better than unjust law; to acknowledge that justice cannot be done is not to say that non-juridfication 
is to be eqated with a state of nature and a bellum# omnia erga ones.  
43  This is a broad discussion in many countries; for Germany, cf., for example, Trute 1996; Mehde 2002; and Fran-
zius 2003. 
44  Fremann 2000: 546, 548. 
45  Freeman 2003: 1290. 
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problématique of the turn to governance is too simplistic. What is at stake is not just the 
performance, but also the capability of the political and administrative system to deliver 
responses which the citizens of democratic states are constitutionally entitled to receive. 
To rephrase this issue in an older language, what is at issue here are the failures of the 
legal system of the modern welfare state, the Democratic Constitutional Interventionist 
State, the DCIS.,46 Its deficiencies have been on the legal theory agenda ever since law-
yers became aware of implementation problems and joined the critique of political and 
legal interventionism that gave rise to the particularly intense debate in the 1980s.  
Broad disappointment with ‘purposive’ legal programmes of economic management 
and a new degree of sensitivity towards ‘intrusions into the life-world’47 through social 
policy prescriptions mirrored the understanding that economic processes were embed-
ded within societies in far more complex ways than a simple market-state dichotomy 
might suggest. This further triggered a search for new modes of legal rationality which 
were to replace interventionism and, by the same token, free themselves from the de-
structive myth that law might get a grip on social reality through the simple application 
of ‘grand theories’. At the same time, however, ‘proceduralisation’48 and ‘reflexive 
law’49 were also concerned with very mundane issues such as the improvement of im-
plementation and compliance. Discrepancies were clear between grand purposive legal 
programmes and their real world social impact: it became a core concern of legal soci-
ology to establish soft-law and regulatory alternatives to command and control regula-
tion.50 In other words, law, concerned with both the effectiveness of economic and so-
cial regulation and its wider social legitimacy, was,very early on, drawn into the refash-
ioning of constitutional and administrative legal spheres. Law was developing far more 
constructive and legitimate synergies between markets and hierarchies. The importance 
of these debates for the assessment of ‘governance’ practices has long gone unnoticed—
but that may now change nonetheless.51  
III.2 Constitutionalising European governance practices through delibe-
rative processes? 
As our survey in Section I has documented, the most important and most successful 
innovations of European governance had been achieved before this concept became so 
popular. To recall the most prominent examples mentioned there: under the new ap-
                                                 
46  For an elaboration of the argument, cf., Joerges 2005: 218-232. 
47  Habermas 1985. 
48  Wiethölter 1989; Habermas 1998 and Habermas 1999: 414-446. 
49  Teubner 1983. 
50  Teubner 1987. 
51  Cf., for example, Scheuerman 2001. 
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proach to technical harmonisation and standards, non-governmental organisations with 
links to administrative bodies, industry, and expert communities are all engaged in long-
term co-operative relationships. Europeanisation has managed to re-arrange these for-
merly national arrangements in such a manner that they operate across national lines 
and across various levels of governance. In the governance arrangements in the food-
stuffs sector, the involvement of administrative bodies has been stronger—‘food safety’ 
has, for a long time, been a concern of public administration. This is why the role of 
bureaucracies in the European ‘administration’ of food safety through the comitology 
system was, and still is, stronger than in the field of standardisation. But it, too, has be-
come a governance arrangement par excellence. Do such arrangements fit into our in-
herited notions of government, administration, and the separation of powers? Can such 
hybrids be legitimate? Is it at all conceivable that their legitimacy will be ensured by 
law?  
These questions concern the ‘nature’ of the European polity, which is now widely 
characterized as a ‘heterarchically’ — as opposed to hierarchically — structured multi-
level system which must organise its political action in networks. This thesis has far-
reaching implications. If the powers and resources for political action in the EU are lo-
cated at various and relatively autonomous levels of governance, the coping with func-
tionally interwoven problem-constellations will depend on the communication between 
the various actors who are relatively autonomous in their various domains, but who, at 
the same time, remain mutually dependent. Compelling normative reasons which milita-
te in favour of such co-operative commitments can be derived directly from the post-
national constellation in which the Member States of the EU find themselves. Their in-
terdependence has become so intense that no state in Europe can take decisions of any 
political weight without causing ‘extra-territorial’ effects for its neighbours. Put provo-
catively, but nonetheless brought to its logical conclusion, the Member States of the EU 
have become unable to act democratically.52  
This is not a critique of some of the imperfections of the systems from which we 
would conclude that the European democratic deficit should not be taken too seriously. 
Our point is more structural and principled. Individual European nation states cannot 
include all the non-national (European) citizens who will be affected by their decisions 
in their own electoral and will-formation processes. And vice versa, their own citizenry 
cannot influence ‘foreign’ political actors who are taking the relevant decisions for 
them. This is, of course, true for the ‘DCIS’ in general — and one of the reasons on 
                                                 
52  See already  note 18 supra. The formula used here may sound drastic, but  the phenomenon which it designates 
has been identified in different disciplines anmd perspeczives in very sim ilar ways: see e.g. von Bogdandy 2003: 
126 f. with references.  
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which the legitimacy of conflict-of-law rules and transnational juridification rests. But 
within the EU, the interdependence of national societies is particularly significant — 
and can also be attributed to the integration process itself. 
We conclude, that the debate on democracy in Europe is too one-sidedly concerned 
with the democracy deficits of the European construction. It neglects the structural de-
mocracy deficits of nation-state members. It fails to conceptualise the potential of Euro-
pean law to cure the democracy deficits of European nation-states. Such a vision of Eu-
ropean law does not suggest ‘democratising’ the European institutions as if they were 
separate bodies. It seeks to conceptualise the whole of the European multi-level const-
ruction in such a way that the European polity will not just be compatible with, but even 
strengthen, democratic processes.53  
This is the task that Jürgen Neyer and the present writer have assigned to European 
law under the heading of ‘deliberative’ — as opposed to orthodox or quasi-statist — 
supranationalism.54 We have argued that our normative claims are not pure fantasies but 
well-founded in important principles of European law: the Member States of the Union 
may not enforce their interests and their laws unboundedly. They are bound to respect 
European freedoms. They may not discriminate. They may only pursue ‘legitimate’ 
regulatory policies approved by the Community. They must co-ordinate with respect to 
what regulatory concerns they can follow, and design their national regulatory provisi-
ons in the most Community-friendly way.  
In the field of social regulation, we have taken a further and more daring step:55 the 
EU-specific context of risk regulation, so we suggested, favours a deliberative mode of 
interaction. Its epistemic components are not simply technocratic but embedded in broa-
der normative practices of reasoning. Is it conceivable for law to strengthen such quali-
ties of social regulation in the EU? Is it conceivable to ‘constitutionalise’ the European 
committee system so that its operation becomes compatible with essentials of the de-
mocratic ideals of policy-making? The answers we found have already (implicitly) been 
rephrased in the distinction used in Sections II 1 and II 2 between conflict-of law-
methodologies and transnational governance arrangements and presented elsewhere at 
length:56 ‘Deliberative Supranationalism Type I’ should respond to the inter-dependence 
                                                 
53  Cf., for similar arguments, Bohman 2003; Caporaso 2003: 368 ff.; and Schmalz-Bruns 2004: Section 3.  
54  Joerges/Neyer 1997. Good, or at least well-meaning, intentions do not cure theoretical failures. And vice versa, 
the often-repeated thesis that deliberative supranationalism is anti-democratic, or, at best, technocratic sounds odd 
to us and is particularly difficult to understand when brought forward together with the insight that the EU cannot 
develop into a state and hence is unable to realise/achieve state bound models of democracy.  
55  Joerges 2003; Neyer 2003; 2004. 
56  For a recent summary, cf., Joerges 2003 with references to earlier work. 
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of semi-autonomous polities by identifying rules and principles that respect the autono-
my of democratically legitimated units and restrict controls to their design. ‘Deliberati-
ve Supranationalism Type II’ should also cope with the apparently irresistible transfor-
mation of institutionalised government into under-legalized governance arrangements. It 
must avoid two dead-end alleys: it must come to terms with the new challenges cannot 
hope to get rid of governance practices through which legal systems have, at all levels, 
responded to the impasses of traditional (administrative, interventionist) regulation. It 
cannot hope to achieve at European level that which could not be accomplished at nati-
onal level, namely, a transformation of the practices of the ‘political administration’ of 
the Internal Market into a Weberian type transnational administrative machinery for 
which the European Commission and the European Parliament could be held accoun-
table. Instead, it should build three types of mechanisms by:57  
¾ getting the interests of non-governmental (in particular, standardisation) bodies 
to commit themselves to fair, politically and socially sensitive procedures 
through which they can build up public trust;  
¾ covering the shadows of the law which cannot prescribe and control the activities 
of non-governmental actors and administrators in detail;  
¾ introducing ‘hard’ procedural requirements to ensure that the governance of the 
Internal Market remains open for revision where new insights are gained or new 
concerns are raised by politically accountable actors.   
The Internal market is a ‘Market without a State’. It need not, and should not, become a 
‘Market without Law’.58  
                                                 
57  As inidicated (see Section I 1 supra), governance by committees and by agencies is not as diverse as the legal 
terms suggest – and the inquiries into the ‘juridification’ of agencies and comitology pose structurally similar dif-
ficulties (see on the example of agencies recently Chiti 2003; Dammann 2004)     
58  There is, of course, an intense debate on the role of law in these analysesd, the strands of which quite faithfully 
mirror the controversies over the proper constitutionalisation of Europe. (1) Implicit in the argument submitted 
here is the rejection of the idea that Europe could legitimize its ‘political administration’ of the Internal Market 
through some pan-European administrative law which would copy nation state models. (2) So, to speak at the op-
posite end of the spectre, there has been a tendency in political and legal writing since the European Commis-
sion’s White paper on Governance (European Commission 2001) to equate ‘good governance’ with panaceas 
such as ‘more transparency’, ‘more pluralism’, ‘broader public debates’, and ‘more participation of civil society’. 
All this may sound very attractive, but to assert that we could achieve the desired discipline without the visible 
and not always welcome force of law seems at best naïve (Schmalz-Bruns 2004; Scheuerman 2004). The third 
way that ‘societal constitutionalism’ is pursuing (albeit quite tentatively as will be visible from the following sec-
tion) assumes that the legitimacy-generating function of law can come to bear ‘beyond the state’ and ‘beyond 
Europe’.  
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III.3 Conclusion: constitutionalising a transnational political administ-
ration  
All the difficulties experienced by the law with respect to governance at national and at 
European level are present at international level, albeit in even more challenging varia-
tions. 
Governance phenomena, as we have defined them in the preceding paragraphs, are 
responses to the regulatory ‘needs’ that the traditional legal system could not fulfil. The 
reasons for these failures and the learning processes that the law underwent at national 
and at European level provide the basis of the following concluding observations which 
will proceed in three steps. After, first, substantiating the specifics of the juridification 
of transnational market governance, we will, secondly, review three types of responses 
to its legitimacy problématique, namely, economic and technocratic rationality, transna-
tional ‘administrative’ law and societal constitutionalism; where these approaches fail, 
we have, thirdly, to rely on conflict of laws, comitas and diplomacy. 
(1) ‘Juridification’ has intensified at international level in many respects. The em-
pirical indicators are so strong that all legal disciplines, as well as political and social 
philosophy are in the process of re-defining their premises. Juridification in the post-
national constellation is broadening in scope and deepening in its reach to such intensity 
that we have to take the notion of ‘law without a state’ seriously, as even Jürgen 
Habermas concludes.59 
The governance phenomena that this essay is exploring concern just one segment of 
these developments. This segment may even seem quite mundane in its importance. It 
is, however, theoretically particularly challenging because it concerns regulatory issues 
and governance practices which do not fit into the traditional categories in which legal 
systems perceive problems, and through which they operate. James Bohman has re-
cently contrasted the present efforts to constitutionalize Europe with American experi-
ences, and drawn a pertinent analogy: Europe is going through a ‘constitutional mo-
ment’ in Bruce Ackerman’s sense, he argues. ‘It is a constitutional moment that is not 
initiated by the People’; …‘it is rather like the case of the New Deal motivated by the 
democratic and functional failures of its existing, not fully constitutionalized use of ad-
ministrative and political power’.60 This characterisation comes close to the ‘political 
                                                 
59  Habermas 2004. On the good reasons for Habermas’ hesitancy cf. Humrich 2004: 17 ff. Humrich himself is 
cautious with the use of the term ‘law’ because he seeks to defend the normative quality that notion carries with it 
in Habermas’ social philosophy and legal theory. He does not address explicitely in his theoretical reflections the 
problématique of ‘deliberative supranationalism type II’. But his reserve against the heritage of ‘regime thery (at 
p. 2) and his inquiries into international environmental law (pp. 36 ff.) mirror the concerns raised here.  
60  Bohmann 2003: 316. 
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administration’ thesis submitted here, but is, at least at international level, not radical 
enough, because the barriers to conceptualising and realising a constitutionalization of 
transnational governance are significantly higher. 
(2) These differences become apparent because the approaches tried out at WTO 
level and in the EU are very similar in their design. 
(a) The formative era of the European Community is particularly instructive in this 
respect. Two answers to the – by now very famous – democracy deficits were devel-
oped, which have been important up to the present and have their equivalents at interna-
tional level. One was the theory of the European Economic Constitution which legiti-
mized — and restricted — European governance through supranationally valid com-
mitments to economic freedoms, open borders and a system of undistorted competition. 
The constitutional perspectives for the law of the WTO, which, in particular, Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann defends are anchored in this tradition.61 They will not be discussed 
here because they do not deal with the type of regulatory concerns and governance ar-
rangements that this essay focuses on.62 As indicated,63 we interpret markets as social 
institutions and are interested in their ‘infrastructure’, i.e., the web of formalized and 
semi-formal relations through which decisions are taken, which the economic theories 
of the functioning of markets do not address directly. 
The second approach to European ‘governance’ was technocratic in that its expo-
nents sought to defend — and to restrict! — European governance activities to a non-
political type of expertise. One contemporary version of this argument has been cited in 
the presentation of the new approach to harmonisation and standards.64 Its most promi-
nent equivalents at international level are ‘expertise’ and ‘science’. There are many rea-
sons for the attractiveness of such references, in particular, of ‘scientific expertise’. 
‘Expertise’ and ‘science’ claim a genuine authority in regulatory decision-making, 
which is, by its very nature, objective (neutral) and un-political. The standards of good 
science are not bound to some specific legal system which endorses the binding quality 
of scientific findings, but they are, by their very nature, transnationally valid. By resort-
ing to scientific expertise, legal systems subject themselves to ‘external’ validity criteria 
— and overcome their territorial parochialism precisely for this reason. If only science 
                                                 
61  Petersmann, for example, 2003. On the importance of this school of thought for the European economic constitu-
tion, cf., Joerges 2004b. For a critical and  instructive evaluation of Petersmann’s contribution to the 
.constitutionalization debate cf. von Bogdandy 2003: 115- 
62  This is, of course, not to say that economic theories have nothing to contribute to issues of social regulation! For 
an instructive survey, cf., Arcuri 2004.  
63  See Section I.1. 
64  Cf., the reference to Nicolas 1995 in Section II.2. 
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could be that objective and find answers to the questions we pose! But, alas, to cite Nik-
las Luhmann’s ironical characterization. ‘an expert is a specialist to whom one can put 
questions he is unable to answer’.65 This is because citizens, policy-makers, and courts 
are all confronted with trans-scientific question. The good expert is aware of these lim-
its, and these limits are, by now, so widely known that the objectivity myth cannot even 
serve as a workable fiction.66  
(b) The standardisation bodies for foodstuffs (CAC) and technical products (ISO, 
IEC, ITU)67 are both linked to the WTO, to other governmental and non-governmental 
actors, and also to national legal systems. Their ‘regulatory authority’ depends upon the 
concrete contents of these links — and on the trust that they build up. ‘Expertise’ is cru-
cial in this respect. But expertise is not sufficient. Since standardisation involves deci-
sion-making, the quality of standardisation procedures is a second dimension on which 
the impact of these organisations depends.  
Unsurprisingly, their record is contested. The technique of incorporating CAC stan-
dards into the WTO system (Article 3.2 SPS Agreement) has been criticised precisely 
because of the internal CAC procedures. These procedures, the critics argue,68 do not 
merit such preferential treatment. The Appellate Body in the Hormones case has been 
very cautious in its determination of the legal status of the CAC standards.69 Moreover, 
the CAC has acknowledged the need to revise its rules.70 Similar caution can be ex-
pected in the response to the complaint by the US against the de facto moratorium on 
approving genetically modified foods by the EU.71 The WTO, we can conclude, has 
                                                 
65  Luhmann 1992: 141. 
66  Cf., instructively, for the WTO context, Christophorou 2000 and 2003; Pauwelyn 2002; V. Walker 2003; and 
Peel 2004 and for a very lucid summary of the sociological debate Bechmann 2003.   
67  See Section II.2 supra. 
68  For example, Godt 1998; Victor 2000; and Herwig 2004. 
69  ‘To read Article 3.1 [of the SPS Agreement] as requiring Members to harmonize their SPS measures by conform-
ing those measures with international standards, guidelines and recommendations, in the here and now, is in ef-
fect, to vest such international standards, guidelines and recommendations (which are by the terms of the Codex 
recommendatory in form and nature) with obligatory force and effect. …[Such an] interpretation of Article 3.1 
would, in other words, transform those standards, guidelines and recommendations into binding norms. But … 
the SPS Agreement itself sets out no indication of any intent on the part of the Members to do so.’ Appellate 
Body Report, EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R and 
WT/DS48/AB/R, para 165. 
70  <http://www.codexalimentarius.net/ccgp20/gp20_01e.htm>.  
71  The establishment of a WTO panel to examine the EC’s ‘moratorium’ on issuing marketing approvals for ‘agri-
cultural biotech products’ and its labelling and traceability requirements for imports of GM food products was re-
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accepted the need to integrate regulatory policies into the free trade system. It has not 
pushed the case for juridification: thus, food standardisation remains closely embedded 
in political processes. This embeddedness, however, is not of the same quality as in 
European governance. The form of legitimacy claimed for (constitutionalized) comitol-
ogy rests upon the epistemic and political potential of deliberative processes to achieve 
fair compromises between conflicting interests, to integrate a plurality of expert knowl-
edge(s), to make use of the management capacities at different levels of governance, 
and to remain open for revision where new insights are gained or new concerns are 
raised by politically accountable actors. Constitutionalized comitology is a proceduralis-
ing endeavour which operates in the shadow of democratically legitimated institutions. 
(c) Reservations similar to those raised against the CAC are voiced with regard to the 
international standard-setting by the ISO and the IEC.72 But these are minority opinions. 
The assessment of the ISO and the IEC is, in general, much more favourable. The most 
positive evaluation is that of Harm Schepel.73). It is also the most challenging interpreta-
tion theoretically.  
In Schepel’s account, ‘good’ governance, as we observe it in standardization both 
within the EU and at international level, is not political rule through institutions as con-
stitutional states have developed them. Instead, it is the innovative practices of net-
works, horizontal forms of interaction, a method for dealing with political controversies 
in which actors, political and non-political, public and private, arrive at mutually ac-
ceptable decisions by deliberating and negotiating with each other. The crux of this ob-
servation is a paradoxical one within traditional democratic theory, and it is counter-
intuitive: productive and legitimate synergy between market and civil society cannot be 
furnished within traditional democratic theory, be that theory majoritarian (working 
with a demos) or deliberative (dispensing with the demos, but placing a ‘governing’ 
emphasis on the primacy of a/the? public sphere). How can this be? To cite Schepel 
once more: 
The paradox is, of course, that the mechanism through which to achieve this is, well, 
politics. Due process, transparency, openness, and balanced interest representation are 
norms for structuring meaningful social deliberation. They are not obviously the appro-
priate vehicles for revealing scientific ‘truth’ or for allowing room for the invisible 
hand.74   
                                                                                                                                               
quested by the US, Canada and Argentina; see DS291: European Communities: Measures affecting the approval 
and marketing of biotech products, 20 May 2003.  
72  For example, Petersmann 2000: 253. 
73  Schepel 2005: 177 ff. 
74  Schepel 2005: 223. 
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This is a message with many theoretical premises and practical provisos. To relate it 
back to the beginnings of this essay,75 the modern economy and its markets are ‘politici-
sed’ in the sense that politically important processes are taking place there. The political 
system cannot reach into this sphere directly. These two steps of the argument do claim 
some plausibility. However, it is the third thesis which is the critical one: there are 
constellations in which the political processes within society seem perfectly legitimate. 
‘Private transnationalism’ is the term that Schepel employs, but ‘societal constitutiona-
lism’ seems a preferable notion because it covers national, European and transnational 
phenomena. But it, too, is a notion in need of further explanations. Those (the few) who 
advocate it accentuate different aspects.76 In the version adopted in this essay, societal 
constitutionalism seeks to respond to three interdependent phenomena: the ‘politicisati-
on’ of markets; the emergence of governance arrangements which need to acknowledge 
the problem-solving capacities and managerial qualities of the private sphere; and the 
transformation of nation-state governance in transnational constellations.77 This is not 
where the law ends, however. Even where non-governmental actors commit themselves 
credibly to normative standards which ‘deserve recognition’, their legitimacy and auto-
nomy, according to Harm Schepel, rests upon the compatibility of their institutionaliza-
tion with the legal institutions surrounding them: it is not, therefore, so surprising that 
standardisation organisations seek to establish procedures in which society as a whole 
can trust, and that sufficiently self-critical law-makers and regulators realise they would 
not be able to substitute what standardisation accomplishes.78 In short, standardisation 
both integrates and co-ordinates private governance actors across national and internati-
onal levels, and reconnects with national and international public spheres, functioning 
all the while, not under their direction, but in their shadow. 
(3) Is the weak transnational juridification of social regulation a bad thing that we 
should try to overcome? It is first of all important to acknowledge the normative argu-
ments against stricter transnational legalization. Their core is that there is simply no 
political authority which would be entitled to take the same type of decisions for which 
constitutional states are legitimated. But it is then equally important to consider the re-
                                                 
75  Section I.2. 
76  Sciulli 1992; Teubner 2004; and Joerges 2004a. 
77  All of these aspects need to elaborated further to be situated properly in present debates. Their reliance (and 
dependence!) on societal law production may be particularly provocative in the eyes of public lawyers (like 
Stewart 2004; Kingsbury et al. 2004) and international lawyers (like Slaughter 2004: 216 ff.). This reliance 
should, however, rather be understood read as a critique of overly optimistic readings of the reach and normative 
quality of public governance.  
78  Cf. J. Scott’s (2004: 211 ff) plea for a supervision of standardization procedures by the Appellate Body. 
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sponses that law can nevertheless help to organize. The most important among them is a 
conflict-of-laws inspired approach to the handling of legal differences which result in 
barriers to free trade.79 The European experience is encouraging and can be developed 
further at WTO level. Conflicts between legal systems which become apparent in legal 
differences in the field of social regulation are usually multi-faceted. They concern po-
litical preferences, economic interests, industrial policy objectives, distributional poli-
tics, and ethical concerns. A proceduralising approach to such conflicts has the potential 
of discovering the nature of the differences and thereby identifying the conditions under 
which the free trade objective can be defended. The conceivable solutions will regularly 
be incomplete, in that they leave it to the concerned jurisdictions to deal with implica-
tions that cannot be handled at international level. The distributional implications of 
regulatory decisions are a case in point; their political implications tend to overburden 
the international system. A strategy of differentiating between the levels of governance, 
which decentralises the management of such difficulties, can be advantageous — pro-
vided that the international level proceeds with sufficient sensitivity to national con-
cerns. 
A balancing of competing ‘governmental interests’ is beyond the functions with 
which courts are equipped and legitimated to perform, Brainerd Currie has argued.80 But 
                                                 
79  A long note on terminology could be inserted here which would have to cover at least three points. (1) The first 
concern the notion of conflict of laws. The core issue of this discipline is in my understanding the task of dealing 
with validity claims which conflicts law should recognize as legitimate in principle. (2) The second step is the 
structural affinity between the conflict of law issue and the conflict between competing, yet legitimate objectives 
within the legal systems of constitutional states (or the EU respectively). Detaching the specific mode of thought 
in conflict of laws from traditional (Savignian) private international law and making it serve other areas of law, 
and in particular a social theory of law, was the great project of Rudolf Wiethölter, explained e.g. in Wiethölter 
1977. As Gunther Teubner (2003; 2004) explains, the point was no longer merely to reflect conflicts between na-
tional legal systems theoretically and cope with them in practice, but to generalize conflict-of-laws thinking itself 
in such a way as to make it yield results for conflicts between complexes of norms, areas of law and legal institu-
tions, but also those between social systems, indeed even for divergences between competing social theories. This 
two-fold recourse to rich historical experience of private international law on the one hand and to competing 
theories of society on the other managed to establish ‘conflicts of laws’ as the central category for legal recon-
struction of social contradictions. (3) The third step concerns the notion of ‘proceduralization’ (note 48 supra) 
and its use both within national legal systems and in postnational constellations. Too much for a footnote, to be 
sure. But by no means entirely idiosyncratic, as a fourth step could show, namely the similarity in substance of 
suggestions submitted in other (or similar!) suggestions. Suffice it here to point Armin von Bogdandys (2003: 
126 ff.) interpretation of the Appellate Body’s approach.  
80  See Currie 1963a-c and Section II.1. 
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in his later writings, Currie has allowed for a ‘moderate and restrained interpretation’ of 
state interests so as to ‘avoid’ conflicts.81 This concession comes close to the type of 
proceduralised conflict management advocated here. It is less juridical in one important 
respect: the search for conflict ‘avoidance’ is, at any rate within the EU, a constitutional 
duty. As Jona Israёl has recently put it: Article 10 EC has turned comity among the 
European nation states into a duty of co-operation.82 The European system of multi-level 
governance is operating within legally defined limits. Law-mediated legitimacy of its 
new modes of governance (their ‘constitutionalisation’) is at least conceivable. 
At WTO level, the transformation of comitas into mandatory commitments may be, 
to rephrase a famous reservation against the constitutionalization of the WTO, ‘a step 
too far’.83 Comity is a softer technique. It involves self-restraint in the assertion of juris-
diction and the application of the lex fori out of respect for foreign concerns. To invoke 
such commitments among WTO members is to suggest that court-like independent bod-
ies — such as the WTO’s Appellate Bodies — remain legitimised to promote amicable 
solutions to disputes where they cannot resolve them through adjudication. Comitas 
would suggest a search for a middle ground between law and politics by advising the 
latter to take the expertise of the former seriously, and by advising the former to be 
aware of the limited legitimacy of law that did or does not originate in a democratic 
process. Where the WTO has reached the borderlines of ‘judicialization’ and does not 
seem empowered to assess policies and economic interests, it may still function as fo-
rum and instigator of fair and workable compromises. What an ambivalent message, 
one may object. And yet, it seems quite instructive that, in such thorough interdiscipli-
nary analyses as that of Mark Pollack and Gregory Shaffer,84 we observe the political 
scientist destroying the lawyer’s normative claims and the lawyer questioning the prac-
tical sensibility of purely explanatory exercises. And one should note that the term ‘law’ 
is employed here not in a descriptive sense which would content itself with observing a 
quasi-statal degree of stability and compliance. In an understanding of law which carries 
with it the promise of justice, the two dimensions of the approach submitted here seek 
to do justice to the weakness of the law: conflict-of-laws in conjunction with societal 
constitutionalism is what we can envisage and improve with some realism.   
                                                 
81  See,especially, Currie 1963d: 763. 
82  Israel 2004: Ch. 3. 
83  Howse/Nicolaїdis 2001; for a comprehensive survey, cf., N. Walker 2001 and a more recent one with a system-
atic close to the categories used here v. Bogdandy: 2003: 114 ff. . 
84  Pollack/Shaffer 2004. 
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